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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is July 6, 2016, and the streets of every city in America are filled with 
people playing the newly-released “Pokémon Go” on their mobile devices.1  At its 
peak, Pokémon Go surpassed the daily app usage record set by “Candy Crush 
Saga” in 2013 with over twenty million daily users.2  Pokémon Go, created and 
developed by Niantic, Inc., is a location-aware application (app) that uses a 
combination of GPS and Wi-Fi to create a location-based, augmented reality in 
which users can act as “Pokémon trainers” by “catching” and “battling” their 
Pokémon, while collecting various items to make the users more successful as 
trainers.3  To catch and battle Pokémon and collect items, trainers must travel 
on foot to find where Pokémon “spawn” and battle other trainer’s Pokémon at 
“Pokémon gyms.”4  
The overwhelming majority of “Pokémon Go’s” spawn points, PokéStops, 
and gyms can be utilized by trainers on public property, and do not create issues 
of trespass.5  However, due to “Pokémon Go’s” utilization of landmarks first 
developed for the app “Ingress,” “Pokémon Go’s” predecessor, some of the 
landmarks and Pokémon spawn locations are located on private property, 
creating some cause for concern.6 
Reports of Pokémon trainers attempting to access “Pokémon Go” locations 
through trespass to private property has led to questions about potential liability 
for the game developers as a result.7  This question of indirect liability for 
Niantic as the result of the direct infringement of property rights by “Pokémon 
Go’s” users is an issue that could have far-reaching implications in the 
development of location-aware technologies.  Complaints stemming from use 
of “Pokémon Go” in sensitive areas like Arlington National Cemetery and the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Jon Russell, Pokémon Go is launching on iOS and Android today, TECHCRUNCH (July 6, 2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/06/pokemon-go-is-launching-on-ios-and-android-today/. 
 2 See Pokémon Go App Downloads and Revenue in Real Time, APPINSTITUTE, http://appin 
stitute.com/pokemongo-realtime-stats/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (comparing peak Daily App 
Usage (DAU) of Pokémon Go (23 Million) and Candy Crush Saga (22 Million)). 
 3 Stephanie Lee, What is Pokémon Go and Why is Everyone Talking About It?, LIFEHACKER (July 
11, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://lifehacker.com/what-is-pokemon-go-and-why-is-everyone-talking-ab 
out-it-1783420761. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Dean Takashi, How Pokémon Go will benefit from Niantic’s lessons from Ingress on location-based game 
design, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 16, 2015, 7:30 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2015/12/16/how-nian 
tic-will-marry-animated-characters-with-mobile-location-data-in-pokemon-go/view-all/. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Tiffany Li, Pokémon Go and The Law: Privacy, Intellectual Property, and other Legal Concerns, 
FREEDOM TO TINKER (July 19, 2016), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2016/07/19/pokemon-go-
and-the-law-privacy-intellectual-property-and-other-legal-concerns/. 
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National Holocaust Museum, have given the question of secondary liability 
traction, and may be the impetus for future litigation.8   
“Pokémon Go” is not the only location-aware app that has drawn the ire of 
property owners. “Waze”, the popular navigation app owned by Google, has 
come under fire by property owners claiming that the app has caused significant 
increases in automotive traffic and associated negative effects as a result of the 
app’s innovative route navigation algorithm that re-routes traffic.9  This can 
sometimes result in increases in traffic in areas not accustomed to heavy 
traffic.10  One legal implication associated with “Waze’s” navigation system is 
the possibility of secondary liability for nuisance caused by the app’s users.11 
Location-aware technology used in apps like “Yelp” and “Waze” provide a 
substantial benefit to society through everything from recommendations for 
nearby restaurants12 and reduced daily commutes,13 to more efficient 
international shipping and improved national defense.14  
There are two competing interests involved in addressing what standard of 
liability should be applied in determining whether producers and owners of 
developing technology are culpable for the direct infringement of the users of 
their technologies.  The first interest involved is that of the property owner 
suffering the infringement.  There is little question that direct liability can be 
imposed on individuals playing Pokémon Go when they trespass on private 
property, but imposing secondary liability on Niantic, Inc. is a different 
question entirely.  Parallels can be drawn to other areas of law, including 
respondeat superior and secondary copyright infringement.  It is important to 
consider the interest conflicting with the interest of the property owners: the 
interest in protecting and developing technology.  
                                                                                                                   
 8 Sarah Ashley O’Brien, Pokémon Go players unwelcome at Arlington, Holocaust museum, CNN: TECH 
(July 13, 2016, 11:34 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/12/technology/pokemon-go-holoca 
ust-arlington/. 
 9 Steve Hendrix, Traffic-weary homeowners and Waze are at war, again. Guess who’s winning?, WASH. 
POST: LOCAL (June 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/traffic-weary-homeowner 
s-and-waze-are-at-war-again-guess-whos-winning/2016/06/05/c466df46-299d-11e6-b989-4e547 
9715b54_story.html. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Adi Robertson, What can you do when Pokémon Go decides your house is a gym?, THE VERGE (July 
12, 2016, 4:46 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/7/12/12159422/pokemon-go-turned-hous 
e-into-gym-augmented-reality-privacy. 
 12 About Us, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/about (last visited Oct. 8, 2017). 
 13 Hendrix, supra note 9. 
 14 GPS Applications, NATIONAL COORDINATION OFFICE FOR SPACE-BASED POSITIONING, 
NAVIGATION, AND TIMING, http://www.gps.gov/applications/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 
As new and novel technologies emerge, and present technologies develop 
and evolve, the law will inevitably be forced to catch up.15  To expect the law to 
adequately address every issue raised by technologies not considered at the time 
of drafting is a foolish endeavor.  Laws are created and amended to meet the 
needs of society, and the needs of society change as society progresses.16  
To illustrate this point, consider two distinct technological developments 
that substantially altered how society addressed intangible property and real 
property, respectively: the printing press and the railroad.  The printing press 
allowed books and manuscripts to be mass-produced, significantly reducing the 
cost and difficulty of spreading information.17  The mass communication made 
possible by the printing press played a significant role in the democratization of 
knowledge and the development of the commercial enterprise of printing.18  
The commercial enterprise of printing led to the first copyright laws.19  With the 
development of the steam engine came the spread of the railroad across the 
United States, and with that came questions regarding how to balance the 
interest in the spread of railroads against the rights of landowners of property 
intersected by railroad tracks.20  What developed was a right given to the 
railroad from the landowner known as a “wayleave,” and with it came questions 
regarding whether the right was proprietary and whether the rail lines were 
private or public property.21  With these examples in mind, this Note next looks 
to the nature and development of location-aware technology. 
B.  LOCATION-AWARE TECHNOLOGY 
Not only has location-aware technology provided a significant benefit to the 
public while raising significant legal problems, but other technologies have had 
this effect as well.  A brief history of the development of these technologies 
needs to be provided before a standard of liability can be determined.  
Location-aware technology is one facet of the continually developing field of 
                                                                                                                   
 15 Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up With Technological Change, 
2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 240–44. 
 16 Id. at 247–56. 
 17 The Printing Press, THE HISTORY GUIDE: LECTURES ON MODERN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY, http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/press.html (last updated May 2, 2016). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH 
LIBRARIES, http://www.arl.org/focus-areas/copyright-ip/2486-copyright-timeline (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2017).  
 20 Moses, supra note 15, at 253–56. 
 21 Id. at 253–54. 
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global positioning system (GPS) technology.22  In addition to the role GPS 
plays with location-aware applications, GPS plays a vital role in commerce, 
travel, and national defense.23  GPS functions through an interconnected system 
of satellites orbiting the Earth positioned in such a way that at least four 
satellites are “visible” to any receiver on Earth at any time.24  Each satellite 
sends a signal at light-speed to your device in regular intervals, and the length of 
time it takes for the signal to reach the satellite from your device determines 
your distance from the satellite.25  When the technology overlays the circles 
from each satellite, based on the time it takes to communicate, it can pinpoint 
your location based on the point at which the circles of three satellites 
intersect.26  
Apps like “Yelp”, “Waze”, and “Pokémon Go” utilize a user’s location in 
relation to other users or other entities, determined through GPS technology, in 
creating the app experience.27  “Waze” and “Pokémon Go” have drawn the ire of 
landowners for nuisance and trespass, respectively, as a result of app users 
either entering onto the land or generally causing a nuisance around the land 
due to use of the app.28  Suits have been threatened against the developers of 
“Waze” and “Pokémon Go,” presenting a unique question: what standard of 
liability should apply in claims of secondary infringement of property rights?  
In order to determine what standard of liability to apply to secondary 
infringement of real property, it is helpful to understand how secondary liability 
is treated in other areas of law, such as tort negligence, patents, and copyright. 
C.  SURVEY OF THE LAW OF SECONDARY LIABILITY 
While this Note will focus primarily on the similarities between contributory 
copyright infringement and secondary liability for infringement of real property 
rights, areas of law outside of copyright can prove helpful in providing 
background.  Respondeat superior is a well-known example of liability imposed 
on a party that did not directly commit the harm.29  Liability for employers 
under respondeat superior is grounded in the liability imposed on principals for 
the acts or omissions of their agents within the general principal-agent 
                                                                                                                   
 22 GPS Applications, NAT’L COORDINATION OFFICE FOR SPACE-BASED POSITIONING, 
NAVIGATION, AND TIMING, http://www.gps.gov/applications/ (last modified Nov. 25, 2014). 
 23 Id. 
 24 How does GPS work?, INST. OF PHYSICS, http://www.physics.org/article-questions.asp?id=55 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2017). 
 25 Id.  
 26 Id. 
 27 See Using the Yelp App, YELP, https://www.yelp-support.com/Using_the_Yelp_App?l=en_ 
US (last visited Oct. 11, 2017).  
 28 See, e.g., Traffic app facing speed bumps in quiet neighborhoods, CBS NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014, 10:01 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/waze-traffic-app-causing-controversy-in-quiet-neighborho 
ods/; Li, supra note 7. 
 29 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006). 
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relationship.30  The acts of employees, within the context of their employment, 
can be attributed to their employer in many situations, because the employer 
has a right to exercise a degree of control over the employee and derives 
benefits from the acts of the employee in the course of their employment.31  
Respondeat superior is commonly supported by some combination of three 
rationales: (1) “that an innocent person, either the plaintiff or the employer, 
must bear the loss”; (2) “that the employer had formal right of control over the 
employee's work”; or (3) “that the employer benefits from the employee's 
work.”32  Principals can also be held liable for real property infringements 
committed by independent contractors in the context of their contractual 
duties.33 
Outside of the principal-agent relationship, indirect liability has been found 
where an actor’s misfeasance “created an undue risk of harm” as between third 
parties.34  Liability for third party defendants from special relationships with 
victims will not be discussed in this Note, because there is no substantial 
overlap in duties owed or rationales employed. 
Copyright infringement, like infringement of real property rights in the 
context of location-aware technology, is a claim steeped in evolving 
technologies.35  
D.  THE THREE ROUTES TO SECONDARY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
Contributory and vicarious copyright infringement are consistently 
contentious topics in the field of intellectual property law.36  Before delving into 
secondary copyright case law, it is helpful to differentiate between secondary 
infringement, vicarious infringement, and contributory infringement.  
Secondary infringement is used in this Note to refer generally to any 
infringement that does not qualify as direct infringement, and vicarious and 
contributory infringement both fall under the umbrella of secondary liability.  
To be liable for vicarious copyright infringement, the secondary infringer must 
have (1) “a right and ability to supervise the infringing activity,” and (2) a 
                                                                                                                   
 30 Id. § 2.04 cmt. b. 
 31 Id. 
 32 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS § 426 (2d ed. June 2016 update). 
 33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427B (AM. LAW. INST. 1965). 
 34 See Weirum v. RKO General Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975) (holding radio station liable in a 
wrongful death suit for the station’s prize giveaway that incentivized contestants to drive 
recklessly, causing a fatal accident, in the hopes of being the first to find the defendant’s agent to 
claim a cash prize). 
 35 See Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 635 
(2008) (analyzing the development of copyright, patent, and trademark law as technology 
developed). 
 36 See id. at 663–67 (illustrating the development of indirect liability for copyright infringement 
and the contention between different decisions).  
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“direct financial interest” in the infringement.37  To succeed in a claim for 
contributory copyright infringement against an alleged secondary infringer, a 
plaintiff must show that the defendant “with knowledge of the infringing 
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of 
another.”38  The modern line of secondary copyright infringement spawned out 
of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 416 (1984), commonly 
referred to as the Sony case.39  
In the Sony case, a group of copyright holders of television programs and 
films brought suit for contributory copyright infringement against Sony Corp. 
of America, claiming that owners of Sony’s Betamax VCR were infringing on 
copyrights through “time-shifting” recorded programming.40  The Supreme 
Court ultimately held that Sony was not liable for contributory copyright 
infringement, finding that the VCR was “capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses,” and that there was no direct infringement by VCR owners because the 
“private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home” constituted fair use.41  The 
“capable of substantial non-infringing use” standard developed in the Sony case 
has played a central role in two subsequent contributory copyright infringement 
cases: A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.42 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., v. 
Grokster Ltd.43 
In Napster, plaintiffs were primarily holders of audio copyrights who sought 
an injunction as well as damages against Napster, Inc. for their MusicShare 
software that allowed software users to transfer files peer-to-peer (P2P) within 
an infrastructure created by Napster.44  Plaintiffs sought to establish that 
Napster was liable for contributory copyright infringement and was vicariously 
liable for copyright infringement.45  The Ninth Circuit found that plaintiffs were 
likely to succeed on both claims, and remanded to the district court with 
directions for altering the preliminary injunction originally brought against 
Napster when the case was first heard in District Court.46  
                                                                                                                   
 37 Gershwin Publ’g Grp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(citations omitted). 
 38 Id. at 1162. 
 39 See A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technological Tensions, 64 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 47–49 (1989) (detailing the “Supreme Court’s ‘trilogy’ of [intellectual 
property] cases” and noting that the Sony Corp. case was “by far the most controversial” of the 
three).  
 40 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419–21 (1984). 
 41 Id. at 442. 
 42 See 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001) (relying on Sony’s fair use and “substantial non-
infringing use” analyses). 
 43 See 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005) (“The parties and many of the amici in this case think the key to 
resolving it is the Sony rule and, in particular, what it means for a product to be ‘capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses.’”). 
 44 Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1010–12. 
 45 Id. at 1027. 
 46 Id. 
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In determining that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on their contributory 
copyright infringement claim, the Court noted that “Napster has actual 
knowledge that specific infringing material [was] available using its system, that it 
could block access to the system by suppliers of the infringing material, and that 
it failed to remove the material.”47  Supporting their determination as to the 
likelihood of success of the vicarious liability claim, the Court noted that 
Napster had a direct financial interest in the infringement and “[had] the right 
and ability to supervise its users’ conduct” but failed to exercise that right.48  
The standard for contributory copyright infringement applied in Napster can be 
viewed as more protective of copyright holders than the standard applied in the 
Sony case.49  
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.,50 the third installment of the 
secondary copyright infringement saga, includes two oft-cited concurrences, by 
Justice Ginsburg and by Justice Breyer that provide helpful background in 
understanding the current state of contributory copyright infringement.51  
Grokster, like Napster, distributed software facilitating P2P transfers of 
electronic files, many subject to copyright protection.52  The majority in Grokster 
vacated the Ninth Circuit’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants and 
remanded, holding that “one who distributes a device with the object of 
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 
affirmative steps . . ., is liable for the resulting acts of infringement.”53  
However, the rationale for vacating and remanding the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
was not uniform across the bench, with two concurring opinions providing 
separate rationales.54  
In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg stated that liability can stem from (1) 
“actively encouraging (or inducing) infringement through specific acts,” or from 
“distributing a product [recipients] use to infringe copyrights, if the product is 
not capable of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing uses.”55  
Justice Ginsburg notes that the two categories overlap to a degree, but “capture 
different culpable behavior,” founded on two concepts traditionally found in 
                                                                                                                   
 47 Id. at 1022 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918, 920–21 
(N.D. Cal. 2000)). 
 48 Id. at 1023 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920–21 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000)). 
 49 Compare id. (applying the right and ability with failure to act standard of secondary liability), 
with Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419–21 (1984) (finding 
liability only where the product was “capable of substantial noninfringing use”).  
 50 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 51 Id. at 942, 949 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring).  
 52 Id. at 913–14 (majority opinion). 
 53 Id. at 918–19. 
 54 Id. at 918, 942, 949.  
 55 Id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S. at 417, 442). 
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patent law: “active inducement liability,” and “contributory liability for 
distribution of a product not ‘suitable for substantial noninfringing use.’ ”56  
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Grokster advocates for a more technology-
protective standard that places greater emphasis on the word “capable” within 
the legal question presented in the Sony case.57  By focusing on a product’s 
capability for “commercially significant noninfringing uses,” Justice Breyer 
would allow greater protection to technology producers by leaving the door 
open to future noninfringing uses of technology which may prove commercially 
significant, that would otherwise be closed off by the standard presented in the 
majority opinion or Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence.58  Liability under the Breyer 
concurrence would therefore require either (1) active advancement of 
infringement by other parties or (2) a product incapable of any “significant 
noninfringing uses.”59 
The next section of this Note will analyze the applicability of the different 
forms of secondary liability discussed in this section in order to create a 
standard for liability in cases of infringement of property rights by users of 
location-aware technologies. 
E.  ANALYSIS 
In order to properly balance society’s interest in protecting innovation and 
socially useful technology with property owners’ right to exclude, the standard 
of liability for secondary infringement of property rights must deter conduct 
that contributes to third-party infringement while not unnecessarily stifling 
innovation as a result of overly broad application of liability.  
This section discusses and analyzes possible solutions and the rationales that 
support them, starting with the principal-agent relationship of respondeat 
superior then moving to secondary copyright infringement.  Next, this section 
will provide a sample application of the standards from Sony, Napster, and 
Grokster, followed by presenting three standards of liability for secondary 
infringement of property rights modeled after the approaches taken in Napster, 
Justice Ginsburg’s Grokster concurrence, and Justice Breyer’s Grokster 
concurrence. 
1.  Interests and Rationales of Respondeat Superior.  The comparison between 
respondeat superior and secondary liability for infringement of property rights 
centers around three elements: (1) the financial interests of employers and 
technology developers in the behavior of their employees and users, 
                                                                                                                   
 56 Id. at 942 (“Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (active inducement liability) with [35 U.S.C.] 
§ 271(c) (contributory liability for distribution of a product not ‘suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use.’)). 
 57 Id. at 953 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 58 Id. at 954. 
 59 Id. at 957–58. 
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respectively; (2) the right and ability to control employees and users; and (3) the 
characterization of the relationships between employer-employee and 
developer-user.60  
The actions of an employee within the context of employment provide a 
benefit to the employer.  Somewhat similarly, technology developers like 
Google and Niantic derive financial benefit from the users of their products, 
whether through in-game purchases or advertising revenue.61  Technology 
developers may or may not have the same right and ability to control users that 
employers have over the actions of their employees within the employment 
context.  Respondeat superior provides helpful comparisons for analyzing 
secondary liability for property infringement, but the difference between the 
employer–employee relationship of respondeat superior and the developer–user 
relationship of the present issue is a significant roadblock to applying the 
respondeat superior standard of liability to secondary liability for property 
infringement. 
Liability for the employer results from the actions of his employee in the 
course of employment.62  The employee, in exchange for compensation, 
undertakes to perform duties ordered by the employer, and in the course of 
performing those duties, or within a reasonable area of performing those duties, 
the employee commits the harm.63  Conversely, in the context of the 
developer–user relationship, the user is not performing a duty for the 
developer.  Instead, he or she uses the developer’s product of his or her own 
free will.  Without compensation, the user is not obligated to act on behalf of 
the developer.  Furthermore, applying a standard of liability akin to respondeat 
superior runs the risk of stifling technological development by application of an 
overly strict standard. 
2.  Interests and Rationales of Contributory Copyright Infringement.  Secondary 
liability for copyright infringement in the context of new and developing 
technologies primarily involves three interests: (1) the interests of the copyright 
holder; (2) society’s interest in protecting new and developing technologies; and 
(3) society’s interest in the promotion of the arts and sciences.64  Interests (1) 
and (3) have significant overlap.  The court in Sony cites to Justice Stewart’s 
approach to ambiguity and confusion in the law of copyright in Twentieth Century 
Music Corp v. Aiken: “[c]reative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but 
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts . . . . [T]he ultimate aim is, by 
                                                                                                                   
 60 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2006). 
 61 See Matt Rosoff, Steve Ballmer: There are four ways to make money in high-tech, INFOWORLD (Nov. 
15, 2012), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2616240/technology-business/steve-balmer—ther 
e-are-four-ways-to-make-money-in-high-tech.html. 
 62 Id. § 2.04. 
 63 Id. § 2.04 cmt. b. 
 64 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430–32 (1984). 
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this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”65  The 
court in Sony declined to apply an absolute protection to copyright holders, 
asserting that noncommercial home use of the VCR furthered the public 
interest by increasing access to television programming, an interest that “is 
consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible 
access to information through the public airwaves.”66 
As Justice Breyer argues in Grokster, overly inclusive liability for secondary 
copyright infringement does not afford developers and entrepreneurs 
protections as they develop new technologies.67  Justice Breyer goes on to argue 
that a narrow interpretation of the rule in the Sony case “has provided 
entrepreneurs with needed assurance that they will be shielded from copyright 
liability as they bring valuable new technologies to market.”68  What Justice 
Breyer advocates for in Grokster can be considered a technology-protective 
standard. 
However, before applying a technology-protective standard to secondary 
copyright infringement, courts have analyzed to varying degrees the capability 
of noninfringing use and the role of the developers in inducing infringement.69  
3.  Copyright Liability Applied.  This Note will apply the different standards for 
secondary liability presented in: Napster, Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation of 
Sony in Grokster, and Justice Breyer’s interpretation of Sony in Grokster, to three 
location-aware applications.  Two of the applications will be fictional, and the 
third will be Pokémon Go. 
The first application will be referred to as “Sneakster.”  “Sneakster” is an 
application designed for, and marketed to, thrill seekers.  Specifically, the 
application is tailored to trespass enthusiasts, allowing users to score points and 
unlock achievements through various trespasses.  The application will feature a 
centralized database of locations with corresponding values for trespass.  The 
application generates revenue through advertisement.  
“Sneakster” would likely incur liability under each of the three standards of 
analogous secondary infringement.  Under Napster, “Sneakster” can be held liable 
if it is shown that (1) “Sneakster” knows, or has reason to know of specific 
infringement by its users, and (2) “Sneakster” materially contributes to the 
infringement.70  By incentivizing infringement through rewarding users for 
trespass in the form of in-game points and achievements, it is fairly clear that 
“Sneakster” knows, or has reason to know, of infringement by its users, 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Id. at 431–32 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
 66 Id. at 425 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) 
(citations omitted)). 
 67 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 956–62 (2005) (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
 68 Id. at 957. 
 69 Id. at 959. 
 70 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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satisfying the first prong of the Napster test. Applying Justice Ginsburg’s two-
prong test in Grokster, “Sneakster” would likely be held liable for secondary 
infringement because, as explained above, “Sneakster” actively induces 
infringement through specific acts, distributes a product that assists users in 
infringing on property rights, and is not capable of “substantial” or 
“commercially significant noninfringing uses.”71  Under Justice Breyer’s 
standard, “Sneakster” would likely be liable because it is a technology that is not 
capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing use and it 
actively encourages infringement.72  However, Justice Breyer’s standard 
considers not only the current capability for noninfringing use, but the potential 
future capability for noninfringing use.73  The significance of this distinction will 
be explained below.  
The second application is in many ways similar to “Sneakster,” however, it is 
distinguished from “Sneakster” by its decentralized, user-controlled storage of 
information.  This application will be referred to as “UrbanX.”  “UrbanX” is an 
urban exploration app that provides an organized search engine that allows 
users to search for potential urban exploration sites based on their location, as 
determined by the application’s GPS technology.  While “UrbanX” does not 
have control over the information, it does encourage users to explore sites that 
are universally known to be private property.  “UrbanX” also derives its revenue 
from advertisement. 
Looking first to the Napster standard, “UrbanX,” through its active 
encouragement of property infringement, likely would satisfy the knowledge 
standard.74  “UrbanX” has reason to know that users of an app tailored for 
urban exploration, which often involves trespass and facilitates the transfer of 
information between users, should be aware of specific instances of 
infringement.75  By providing the search function and organizational structure, 
it is likely that courts would find that “UrbanX” materially contributed to the 
property infringements of its users.  Justice Ginsburg’s standard would require 
“UrbanX” to either actively induce infringement through specific acts or 
distribute a product that assists in infringement and is not capable of substantial 
noninfringing use.76  “UrbanX,” as noted above, would likely be found to 
actively induce infringement by its users, and it is a product that undoubtedly 
assists users in infringing.  
However, some questions arise when considering whether the app is capable 
of substantial noninfringing use.  Under Justice Ginsburg’s standard, the 
evidentiary burden on the alleged secondary infringer is a heavier burden than it 
                                                                                                                   
 71 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 948 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 72 Id. at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 73 Id. at 953–54. 
 74 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020. 
 75 Id. at 1020–21. 
 76 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 949 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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would be under Justice Breyer’s standard.77  Under Justice Breyer’s standard, if 
the defendant can show that there is capability of substantial noninfringing use 
presently or in the future, the developer can escape liability if there is no active 
inducement of infringement.78  The active inducement of infringement element 
would likely doom “UrbanX,” but the distinction is important in cases where 
active inducement of infringement is not present. 
Finally, this Note will apply each of the above-referenced standards to 
“Pokémon Go.”  “Pokémon Go” features location-based material developed 
primarily in “Ingress.”  “Pokémon Go” ties its location-based material to local 
landmarks.  
Under Napster, “Pokémon Go” would not satisfy either the knowledge 
requirement or the material contribution requirement, although the latter could 
be argued to an extent.79  “Pokémon Go” maintains a massive network of 
geolocation points on fixed locations.80  However, unlike “Sneakster” or 
“UrbanX,” the appeal of the “Pokémon Go” locations is not that they are private 
property.  “Pokémon Go” features a significant amount of locations on public 
property that are equally valuable to users and do not come with the attached 
legal risk of locations on private property.81  Simply having some location 
points on private property is unlikely to be considered a material contribution 
to infringement without specific knowledge of the infringement or active 
inducement to infringe.  “Pokémon Go” issues a disclaimer against trespassing 
before loading the game and has procedures in place to report locations on 
private property, making it very unlikely a court would find active inducement 
of infringement.82  Additionally, as noted above, the technology of “Pokémon 
Go” has a substantial noninfringing use.  Using the application in public does 
not infringe on property rights, and public use is certainly a substantial portion 
of the application’s use.  As such, “Pokémon Go” would escape liability under 
both Justice Ginsburg’s and Justice Breyer’s approaches. 
In setting a proper standard for liability for location-aware applications, 
copyright liability shares substantial considerations and features many of the 
same contentions.  In weighing the interests of property owners and technology 
protection, one approach adequately balances the interests: Justice Breyer’s 
interpretation of the standard espoused in Sony.   
                                                                                                                   
 77 Id. at 959 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 78 Id. at 953–54. 
 79 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020. 
 80 Takashi, supra note 5. 
 81 Li, supra note 7. 
 82 Id. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
Shaping secondary liability for property infringement by location-aware 
applications in the image of Justice Breyer’s interpretation of the Sony standard 
for secondary copyright infringement should be applied because Justice Breyer’s 
standard protects technology.  
Any stricter interpretation would weaken the law’s ability to protect 
technology, and any positive impact on property owners derived from a stricter 
interpretation would not outweigh the harm done to technology.  As outlined in 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence, a broad interpretation of the protections afforded 
to new technology under Sony protects society’s interest in the continuing 
advancement of technology because the rule: (1) is clear, (2) makes imposition 
of liability difficult, (3) is forward thinking, and (4) eases judicial strain in 
analyzing technological matters.83  
The rule’s clear line of liability allows developers to know whether their 
application will be subject to liability before they invest significant amounts of 
time and money.  Conversely, the rule deters developers from making 
applications that actively induce infringement or are incapable of substantial or 
commercially significant noninfringing use.  The rule only imposes secondary 
liability where the application is almost exclusively used for infringement or 
actively induces infringement.  The rule contemplates future use by considering 
plausible future capability for noninfringing use, thereby allowing technology to 
develop.  Allowing courts to consider current and plausible future use in 
answering questions of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing use 
lessens the burden on judges to decide between technology experts provided by 
either side in determining whether current or future capability should be 
considered. 
Applying the case-by-case analysis championed in Napster84 or Justice 
Ginsburg’s analysis that places a heavier burden on the defendant85 would 
weaken the law’s ability to protect technology.  A heavier evidentiary burden on 
the defendant makes defense more difficult and costly and may subject many 
technology developers to lawsuits brought by wealthy plaintiffs looking to 
unjustly enjoin a defendant’s operations.  The case-by-case approach creates 
uncertainty for developers and may deter potential developers from entering the 
market.  Either approach could “chill . . . technological development.”86 
Any gain to property holders that could result from a stricter interpretation 
and implementation of liability would not outweigh the harm done to 
developing technologies.  The positive impact gained, ostensibly more control 
over one’s own property, while beneficial to the property owner, and perhaps to 
                                                                                                                   
 83 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 957–58. 
 84 Napster, 239 F.3d 1004. 
 85 Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 945 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 86  Id. at 960 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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society to an extent, hardly outweighs the possibility of a chill to technological 
development.  Furthermore, unlike the massive scope of file transfers 
associated with copyright infringement through services like Napster and 
Grokster, real property infringement can be combatted to a great degree 
through pursuit of the direct infringer.  
Ultimately, the interests of advancing technology hold more weight than the 
interests of property owners when analyzing secondary infringement.  Thus, 
adopting a standard that is grounded in the public policy interest of advancing 
technology is the most logical choice for this developing area of law.  
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